Suchergebnisse

The Vaccines for Peace (VFP) proposal (Geissler, 1992) has been discussed, inter alia, by Graham Pearson and Oliver Thränert (this issue), as well as by Milton Leitenberg (1992a; 1992b) and other participants at the Biesenthal workshop (see Morse, this issue).

This article recommends establishment of an internationalVaccines for Peace(VFP) program to undertake research on and production of vaccines against pathogens (and possibly toxins) that pose natural health threats and that are also putative biological (and toxin) weapons. Vaccines for Peace is designed to contribute to health care in developing countries, enhance international cooperation in biotechnology, and reduce the danger of weapons proliferation. Vaccine development would be carried out openly and would involve scientists from developing countries that are States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as personnel and facilities from the former Soviet Union. The program would thus help convert biological defense personnel and facilities to peaceful purposes. The program would be administered by the World Health Organization.

There seems to be an obvious contradiction in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Whereas Article III reasonably requests restriction of transfer of biological warfare (BW) and toxin warfare (TW) agents, equipment, and means of delivery, Article X not less reasonably calls for peaceful international cooperation in microbiology. This contradiction became especially obvious in the late 1980s, for two reasons: (1) regional conflicts increased as one of the consequences of the peaceful end of the Cold War, with a corresponding increase in the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and (2) the technology gap between North and South continued to expand, not least as a direct consequence of the rapid development of molecular biotechnology in industrialized countries.

In agreement with the overwhelming number of experts, I certainly share the view of Chevier and Hansen that the Biological Weapons Convention needs to be strengthened. Of course it is still a matter of discussion whether the military utility of biological and toxin weapons (hereafter, respectively, BW and TW) changed after the introduction of biotechnology. It is impossible, however, to ignore the 1986 statement of the U.S. Department of Defense (1988), that:… perhaps the most significant event in the history of biological weapons development has been the advent of biotechnology. It enables the development of new microorganisms and products with new, unorthodox characteristics… Conceptually, then, a nation or terrorist group can design a biological weapon to meet a variety of contingencies or needs… The break through and the subsequent achievements make biological warfare much more feasible and effective for countries which either are not bound by the convention or which choose to violate it.

The German army's 1943 flooding of the Pontine Marshes south of Rome, which later caused a sharp rise in malaria cases among Italian civilians, has recently been described by historian Frank Snowden as a unique instance of biological warfare and bioterrorism in the European theater of war and, consequently, as a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting chemical and biological warfare. We argue that archival documents fail to support this allegation, on several counts. As a matter of historical record, Hitler prohibited German biological weapons (BW) development and consistently adhered to the Geneva Protocol. Rather than biological warfare against civilians, the Wehrmacht used flooding, land mines, and the destruction of vital infrastructure to obstruct the Allied advance. To protect its own troops in the area, the German army sought to contain the increased mosquito breeding likely to be caused by the flooding. Italians returning to the Pontine Marshes after the German retreat in 1944 suffered malaria as a result of environmental destruction, which was banned by the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and by subsequent treaties. In contrast, a state's violation of the Geneva Protocol, whether past or present, involves the use of germ weapons and, by inference, a state-level capability. Any allegation of such a serious violation demands credible evidence that meets high scientific and legal standards of proof.

Background. Disinformation, now best known generically as "fake news," is an old and protean weapon. Prominent in the 1980s was AIDS disinformation, including the HIV-from-Fort-Detrick myth, for whose propagation some figures ultimately admitted blame while others shamelessly claimed credit. In 2013 we reported a comprehensive analysis of this myth, finding leading roles for the Soviet Union's state security service, the KGB, and for biologist and independent conspiracy theorist Jakob Segal but not for East Germany's state security service, the Stasi. We found Stasi involvement had been much less extensive and much less successful than two former Stasi officers had begun claiming following German reunification. In 2014 two historians crediting the two former Stasi officers coauthored a monograph challenging our analysis and portraying the Stasi as having directed Segal, or at least as having used him as a "conscious or unconscious multiplier," and as having successfully assisted a Soviet bloc AIDS-disinformation conspiracy that they soon inherited and thenceforth led. In 2017 a German appellate court found our 2013 analysis persuasive in a defamation suit brought by a filmmaker whose work the 2014 monograph had depicted as co-funded by the Stasi.Question and methods. Were our critics right about the Stasi? We asked and answered ten subsidiary questions bearing upon our critics' arguments, reassessing our own prior work and probing additional sources including archives of East Germany's Partei- und Staatsführung [party-and-state leadership] and the recollections of living witnesses.Findings. Jakob Segal transformed and transmitted the myth without direction from the KGB or the Stasi or any element of East Germany's party-and-state leadership. The Stasi had trouble even tracking Segal's activities, which some officers feared would disadvantage East Germany scientifically, economically, and politically. Three officers in one Stasi section did show interest in myth propagation, but their efforts were late, limited, inept, and inconsequential.Conclusion. The HIV-from-Fort-Detrick myth, most effectively promoted by Jakob Segal acting independently of any state's security service, was not, contrary to claims, a Stasi success.

Doi:10.2990/32_2_2, published by Association for Politics and the Life Sciences at Texas Tech University and the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, October 2013.